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8 Industrialization and Employment in 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, 
and Taiwan 
Gary S. Fields 
What are the links between macroeconomic growth and microeconomic 
development objectives? The initial view held by many economists, espe-
cially Latin America specialists, was that the goals of growth, employment, 
and income distribution are mutually incompatible and that the pursuit of 
all these objectives at once is bound to be futile. But in the last few years, 
studies of the economies of the Asian Newly Industrializing Countries 
(NICs), Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan—the so-called "Group 
of Four"—have emerged, and they point to very rapid aggregate growth 
and marked improvements in labor market conditions and in income 
distribution.1 This chapter assembles the latest available information and 
For helpful discussions and suggestions, I wish to thank Walter Galenson, Shirley Kuo, 
Paul Liu, Pang Eng Fong, M. K. Ramakrishnan, Chia Siow Yue, Edward Chen, Tzong-biau 
Lin, Victor Mok, Se-Il Park, Vivian Fields, Jorge Ducci, Olivia Mitchell, Lawrence Krause, 
and the participants in seminars at the University of Hong Kong, the Korea Development 
Institute, the Brookings Institution, and Harvard University. None of these persons or 
institutions should be held responsible for the contents of this paper. It is a pleasure to 
acknowledge the invaluable research assistance of Jorge Ducci and the able typing of Debbie 
Nivison. 
1. Among the useful sources are: 
Hong Kong: Ronald Hsia and Laurence Chau, Industrialization, Employment and Income 
Distribution (London: Croom Helm, 1978), and Steven Chow and Gustav Papanek, "Laissez 
Faire, Growth, and Equity—Hong Kong," The Economic Journal (June 1981). 
Korea: Irma Adelman and Sherman Robinson, Income Distribution Policy in Developing 
Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) and Hakchung Choo, "Economic 
Growth and Income Distribution," in Human Resources and Social Development in Korea, 
edited by Chong Kee Park (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1980). 
Singapore: V. V. Bhanoji Rao and M. K. Ramakrishnan, Income Inequality in Singapore 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1980), and Pang Eng Fong, "Economic Develop-
ment and the Labor Market in a Newly Industrializing Country: The Experience of Singa-
pore," The Developing Economies (March 1981). 
Taiwan: John C. H. Fei, Gustav Ranis, and Shirley W. Y. Kuo, Growth with Equity: The 
Taiwan Case (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), and Walter Galenson, ed., Eco-
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examines the interrelationships between the macroeconomy and the labor 
market, with special reference to foreign trade and foreign investment. 
The impressive macroeconomic improvements that have taken place in 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan are well known and include: 
1. Extremely high rates of GDP growth. Economic growth 
rates averaged 8 percent and more in real terms throughout 
the sixties and seventies. Growth of this magnitude would 
be expected to shift the derived demand for labor curve 
outward, raising employment. 
2. High rates of growth of exports. Each country achieved high 
GNP growth through export-led growth in which foreign 
investment played an important role. In the seventies, the 
rates of export growth ranged from 4.8 percent per year in 
Hong Kong to 28.8 percent in Korea. Because the export 
industries are labor-intensive, export growth would imply 
improvements in labor market conditions. 
3. Structural shifts in the locus of economic activity. Over the 
last two decades, important sectoral changes have taken 
place. Most notable are the decline of agriculture and the 
rising importance of manufacturing in Korea, Singapore, 
and Taiwan, and the growth of finance relative to other 
economic sectors in Hong Kong. The labor market implica-
tions of these structural shifts are examined below. 
As impressive as the macroeconomic improvements, though a subject of 
less attention, are the gains that have taken place with respect to labor 
market conditions and income distribution. Unemployment rates have 
fallen below 4 percent while labor force participation rates have been 
rising. The industrial composition of employment has improved, in that 
workers have left agriculture, self-employment, and unpaid family work— 
all relatively low paying activities—and moved into modern-sector jobs, 
where earnings are higher. The occupational structure of modern-sector 
employment has improved. Real wages have increased by as much as a 
factor of four.2 Relative income inequality has fallen in three of the econ-
omies (Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan). Absolute poverty has sharply 
nomic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1979). 
For an overall comparison of Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan: Edward K. Y. 
Chen, Hyper-Growth in Asian Economies (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979). 
2. Throughout this chapter, I use the terms "earnings" or "wages" to refer to pay per week 
or month. 
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diminished in all four. Real wages and incomes are a great deal higher 
throughout the four Asian NICs than they were two decades ago. 
But not everything is entirely rosy. Korea suffered a serious recession in 
1980, and there is some worry that the structural problems leading up to 
that recession have not been dealt with satisfactorily. Income inequality 
appears to be on the rise in Hong Kong and Korea. Wage growth in 
Singapore has lagged seriously behind the growth of national income. All 
four economies are vulnerable to world recession, to changing trade oppor-
tunities and conditions, and to possible squeezes from above by the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
and Japan and from below by emerging less developed economies such as 
Malaysia and the Philippines. Political uncertainties also loom on the 
horizon. 
Improvements in Labor Market Conditions 
and Income Distribution 
Rates of Employment and Unemployment 
The most commonly used indicator of labor market conditions is the 
unemployment rate. Unemployment rates at the beginning of the eighties 
were: Hong Kong, 4.3 percent; Korea, 4.1 percent; Singapore, 3.1 
percent; and Taiwan, 1.3 percent. Compared to the unemployment rates 
in many Western nations, this is a very favorable performance. 
Table 8.1 presents time series data on changes in unemployment over 
time. In two of the countries—Korea and Taiwan—data have been avail-
able on an annual basis since the fifties and sixties. They indicate quite 
steady declines in unemployment rates. In Hong Kong and Singapore, the 
data until the mid-seventies are more fragmentary. In each case, the 
earliest source is a population census. I am hesitant to compare these 
unemployment rates with later ones, because of major methodological 
differences between the earlier sources and subsequent ones.3 If, then, we 
use only later data, we find that the unemployment rate in Hong Kong rose 
in the early seventies and then fell to about 4 percent of the labor force, 
whereas in Singapore unemployment hovered around 10 percent through-
out the late sixties, then fell sharply to the neighborhood of 3 percent in the 
early eighties. 
3. For instance, in Hong Kong, the Population Census 1961, Table 215, categorizes the 
entire population, including infants and children, into various groups of employees, unem-
ployed, retirees, independent workers, students, housewives, etc. Later censuses, much 
more sensibly, tabulate only persons in the economically active population over the age of 14; 
these persons are broken down into "working persons" and "unemployed persons," omitting 
entirely students, housewives, retirees, and other economically inactive people. Thus, the 
groupings in the 1961 figures do not conform to those in later censuses, so intercensus 
comparisons of unemployment rates should probably not be made. 
Table 8.1. Unemployment Rates (%) 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
Censuses 
& 
House-
hold 
Surveys 
1.7C 
4.4d 
4.3" 
Hong Kong 
Labor 
Force 
Surveysb 
Sept. 
Mar. 5.6 
Mar. 4.5; Sept. 
Mar. 3.8; Sept. 
Mar. 2.3; Sept. 
Mar. 3.2; Sept. 
9.1 
4.1 
2.7 
3.4 
4.3 
Korea 
8.2 
7.7 
7.4 
7.1 
6.2 
5.1 
4.8 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.0 
4.1 
4.1 
3.9 
3.8 
3.2 
3.8 
5.2 
4.1 f 
Singapore 
Censuses 
& 
House-
hold 
Surveys 
5.2C 
9.1d 
10.4C 
7.0d 
4.8d 
3.5d 
Labor 
Force 
Surveys 
4.0d 
3.9 
4.5 
4.4 
3.9 
3.6 
3.3 
3.1 
Labor 
Force 
Surveys 
4.3 
3.3 
3.1 
2.3 
1.7 
1.9 
1.7 
1.7 
1.5 
1.3 
1.5 
2.4 
1.5 
1.3 
1.7 
1.3 
1.2 
1.3 
Taiwan3 
Shirley 
W. Y. Kuo 
6.3 
6.0 
6.0 
5.6 
5.7 
5.9 
6.0 
6.1 
6.2 
6.3 
6.4 
6.4 
5.2 
4.2 
3.4 
2.8 
3.4 
3.0 
3.0 
2.8 
2.2 
2.7 
3.7 
Census 
of 
Popu-
lation 
6.3 
6.1 
4.6 
Sources: For Hong Kong, computed from official census publications and Census and Statistics Depart-
ment, Report on Labor Force Survey (various issues). 
For Korea, Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook (1981), table 145, pp. 270-71; and Monthly 
Economic Statistics (December 1981), table 96, p. 125. 
For Singapore, Census and Household Surveys, computed from the respective official publications; 
Report on the Labor Force Survey of Singapore (various issues). 
For Taiwan, Walter Galenson, "The Labor Force, Wages and Living Standards," in Galenson, ed., 
Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), table 
6.13; Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1981, table 2.9; Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China (1981), supplementary table 4, p. 60. 
aAge not specified. 
bAs proportion of labor force, ages 15 through 64. 
°As proportion of economically active population, all ages. 
dAs proportion of economically active population, ages 10 and over. 
eAs proportion of economically active population, ages 14 and over. 
"Third quarter, 1981. 
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All four economies achieved low rates of unemployment despite two 
demographic factors that made the attainment of full employment more 
than ordinarily difficult—population growth and rising labor force partic-
ipation. 
Table 8.2 displays population growth figures for each country. These 
growth rates, though moderate by international standards, nonetheless 
obligated the economies of these countries to create more jobs to attain a 
given employment rate. Population growth rates declined in all four coun-
tries as a result of falling birth rates and/or reduced immigration. Birth 
rates fell for a variety of reasons: the desire for smaller families, a decline in 
birth rates catching up with an earlier decline in child mortality, improved 
access to birth control information and technology, and government en-
couragement of small families. Immigration declines reflected restrictive 
government policies. Table 8.2 also shows that Korea, Singapore, and 
Taiwan clearly were able to expand employment at a rate faster than that at 
which the population was growing. Not so for Hong Kong. There, employ-
ment growth did not keep up with population growth, in part because of 
spurts of massive immigration; in 1980, immigration was severely re-
stricted. 
The other important demographic factor at work was rising labor force 
participation. Economic development frequently causes labor force partic-
ipation rates to change. The reasons differ for men and women. For 
women, economic development commonly creates new job opportunities 
Table 8.2. Population Growth and Employment Growth (% per annum) 
Hong Konga Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Employment Employment Employment Employment 
Growth Growth Growth Growth 
1961-76 = 3.1 1963-77 = 3.8 1957-79 = 3.7 1950-79 = 3.5 
1963-70 = 3 . 0 
1970-78 = 4 . 1 
Population Growth Population Growth Population Growth Population Growth 
1961-76 = 3.4 1960-80 = 2.1 1960-79 = 1.9 1950-79 = 2.9 
Sources: For Hong Kong, Hong Kong Annual Report, various issues. 
For Korea, Population growth: Economic Planning Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook 
(1981), table II. I, p. 37. Employment growth: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook 
(1979), table 136, pp. 256-57. 
For Singapore, Population growth: Singapore Yearbook, various issues. Employment 
growth: Computed from 1957 Census and 1979 Labor Force Survey. 
For Taiwan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Statistical Year-
book of the Republic of China (1980), supplementary table 1, p. 4. 
"For population ages 15 and over. 
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and raises the return on work in the labor market relative to work in the 
home, inducing larger numbers of women to participate in the labor force. 
For men, higher standards of living raise life expectancy, increase the 
likelihood that an older worker will live long enough and be able to afford to 
retire before he dies, and permit young males to remain in school longer— 
all of which lower male labor force participation rates. 
Table 8.3 shows changing labor force participation rates in the four 
countries. In each, labor force participation rates rose for women and, 
except in Singapore, fell for men. The aggregate participation rate for both 
sexes went up in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan and was effectively un-
changed in Hong Kong. With labor force participation rates on the rise, the 
fall in unemployment rates is all the more impressive, since enough new 
jobs were created to employ those who were attracted into the labor force 
by improved job opportunities as well as those who previously were 
unemployed. 
Note too the range in labor force participation rates across the four 
economies. Taiwan's is the highest. Although to the best of my knowledge, 
the reasons for these differences have not been explored rigorously in any 
empirical study, one contributing factor appears to be the four economies' 
respective rates of unemployment. Observe that the rank ordering of 
labor force participation rates is: Taiwan highest, then Singapore, Korea, 
and Hong Kong, whereas the rank ordering of unemployment rates is just 
the opposite—Hong Kong highest, then Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
This is consistent with an "encouraged worker effect," that is, the availabil-
ity of jobs encourages additional persons to enter the labor force and fill 
those jobs. 
Employment Composition 
Besides improvements in the rate of employment, employment composi-
tion also improved during the sustained period of growth in the four Asian 
NICs. These improvements are revealed in the following data on the mix of 
jobs by industry, activity status, occupation, and education. 
Employment by Industry. The industrial mix of employment has shifted in 
favor of relatively high-paying activities. To establish this, we must first 
identify the well-paying industries. Table 8.4 presents the current struc-
ture of earnings by one-digit industry. In each country, two industries— 
agriculture and manufacturing—exhibit wage levels below their economy-
wide averages. The below-average wage position of agriculture is not 
surprising; the same is generally true around the world. But the position of 
manufacturing as a relatively low-wage industry is unusual by international 
standards. In other developing regions, manufacturing wages are above 
CD 
Table 8.3. Labor Force Participation Rates (as % of population ages 15 and over) 
Males 
Females 
Both sexes 
Hong 
1961 
76.5 
32.3 
55.0 
Kong 
1971 
70.9 
37.1 
54.2 
1963 
76.4 
36.3 
55.3 
Korea 
1970 
75.1 
38.5 
55.9 
1980 
73.6 
41.6 
57.6 
1957 
76.6 
19.3 
49.0 
Singapore 
1970 
67.6 
24.6 
46.6 
1979 
80.7 
41.9 
61.4 
1960 
87.2 
25.0 
56.8 
Taiwan 
1970 
80.4 
30.2 
57.1 
1979 
82.4 
46.7 
65.5 
Sources: For Hong Kong, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Social 6- Economic Trends, 1964-1974, table 2.1, p. 5. 
For Korea, Economic Planning Board, Annual Report on the Economically Active Population, 1974, tables 5.2 and 5.3, p. 31; and Korea Statistical 
Yearbook, 1981, table III. I, p. 69. 
For Singapore, Population Census 1970, table 10.1; and Report on Labor Force Survey, 1979, table 1. 
For Taiwan, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1980, supplementary tables 1 and 8. 
Table 8.4. Current Structure of Earnings (wages) by Industry 
Industry 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Utilities 
Construction 
Commerce 
Transport 
Finance 
Services 
Unclassified 
All industries 
Hong 
Kong" 
1980 
1,000 
1,070 
1,750 
1,770 
1,790 
1,850 
1,850 
1,480 
1,380 
Korea1 
1980 
n.a. 
203 
147 
283 
258 
211 
203 
282 
275 
176 
Earnings (wages) 
Singapore 
> 
1977c 
282 
359 
430 
434 
400 
417 
687 
366 
399 
1979d 
118 
215 
119 
165 
139 
135 
162 
194 
164 
143 
Taiwan 
1979e 
63 
110 
96 
138 
106 
135 
143 
145 
125 
76 
105 
Hong 
Kong 
1980 
[o.72 
0.78 
1.27 
1.28 
1.30 
1.34 
1.34 
1.07 
1.00 
Percentage 
Korea 
1980 
1.15 
0.83 
1.61 
1.46 
1.20 
1.16 
1.60 
1.56 
1.00 
of Average Earnings 
Singapore 
1977 
0.71 
0.90 
1.08 
1.09 
1.00 
1.05 
1.72 
0.92 
1.00 
1979 
0.83 
1.50 
0.83 
1.15 
0.97 
0.94 
1.13 
1.36 
1.15 
1.00 
Taiwan 
1979 
0.60 
1.05 
0.91 
1.31 
1.01 
1.29 
1.36 
1.38 
1.19 
0.72 
1.00 
Sources: For Hong Kong, Report on Labor Force Survey (September 1980), table 1.49. 
For Korea, Economic Planning Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1981, table 3.8, p. 83. 
For Singapore, Survey of Households 1977, table 10; Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1979, table 28. 
For Taiwan, Survey of Personal Income 1979, table 7. 
"Median earnings per month (HK$). 
Mean monthly earnings of regular employees by industry (thousands of won). 
cMean earnings per month (S$), based on survey of households. 
Weekly earnings of employees, based on survey of establishments. 
"Annual primary income per working recipient (NT$ thousands). 
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average. The premium of manufacturing wages over agricultural wages is 
about 20 percent in the four Asian NICs, compared to about 100 percent 
elsewhere.4 Reasons for these differences are examined below. 
Data on changes in employment structure over time are given in table 
8.5. The four countries started the sixties with varying employment struc-
tures. Hong Kong was the most industrialized of the four; there, manufac-
turing was the largest sector of employment, engaging 43 percent of the 
labor force in 1961. In Taiwan as well, manufacturing was the largest 
employer, accounting for 32 percent of nonagricultural employment in 
1964. In contrast, Korea and Singapore were notably less industrialized 20 
years ago, the shares of manufacturing in total employment having been 22 
percent and 18 percent respectively. 
These initial conditions partly explain how the industrial structure of 
employment evolved in the last 20 years. Hong Kong, having the most 
advanced manufacturing sector around 1960, had the least scope for growth 
of manufacturing employment. Indeed, Hong Kong's industrial structure 
of employment has been the most stable of the four, the growth of employ-
ment in manufacturing in the sixties and seventies being only slightly 
above the average for nonagricultural employment as a whole (4.1 percent 
per year versus 3.6 percent). By contrast, commerce and finance expanded 
employment by 8 percent and 9 percent per year respectively in Hong 
Kong. Thus, while the share of manufacturing in nonagricultural employ-
ment virtually held constant, the share of commerce and finance more than 
doubled (from 12 percent to 26 percent). 
In the other three countries, the percentage of the work force employed 
in manufacturing was initially smaller. Manufacturing employment was 
able to grow quickly, because of the growth of manufacturing output 
oriented primarily toward the export market. In Korea and Taiwan, the 
only other industries to achieve comparable rates of employment growth 
were the construction sectors, while in Singapore only the finance sector 
grew faster than did manufacturing. By 1979, the share of manufacturing 
employment in total employment in Taiwan (41 percent) was nearly as 
large as in Hong Kong (42 percent). 
On the other end of the industrial distribution, agricultural employment 
has diminished in relative importance in each country. As recently as the 
early sixties, half or more of Taiwan's and Korea's labor forces were 
employed in agriculture; those shares were about halved by the late 
seventies. In absolute terms, agricultural employment remained un-
4. In Mexico, for example, average weekly wages among manufacturing workers were 127 
percent of the economy-wide average and the agricultural wage 64 percent, producing a 
manufacturing/agriculture wage differential of 2:1. (David Turnham, The Employment Prob-
lem in Less Developed Countries [Paris: OECD: 1971], p. 75). 
to 
Table 8.5. Changes in the Structure of Employment by Industry 
Industry 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Utilities 
Commerce 
Finance 
Transport 
Services 
Unclassified 
Percentage of 
nonagricultural 
employment 
Agriculture as 
a percentage of 
total employment 
1961 
0.8 
43.1 
9.1 
1.7 
10.4 
1.5 
6.9 
24.0 
1.5 
100.0 
7.4 
Hong Kong 
1971 
3.3 
43.8 
11.0 
0.6 
I 13.5 
7.6 
20.3 
n.a. 
100.0 
4.0 
1976 
0.1 
46.1 
5.9 
0.5 
19.7 
3.4 
7.6 
15.4 
1.3 
100.0 
2.5 
1980 
0.0 
7.7 
0.5 
26.8 
4.9 
7.6 
16.3 
100.0 
1.4 
Percentage Distribution of Employment 
1963 
2.0 
21.6 
6.8 
0.9 
26.8 
4.0 
37.9 
n.a. 
100.0 
63.2 
Korea 
1970 
2.3 
26.6 
5.9 
• 65.2 
100.0 
50.4 
1980 
1.4 
32.8 
9.3 
56.5 
100.0 
34.0 
1957 
17.4 
5.0 
0.9 
• 30.8 
11.2 
33.7 
0.8 
100.0 
6.9 
Singapore 
1970 
22.8 
6.9 
1.2 
24.3 
3.7 
12.6 
28.2 
0.4 
100.0 
3.5 
1979 
29.2 
5.4 
1.0 
23.6 
7.2 
11.8 
21.6 
0.2 
100.0 
1.5 
1964 
3.0 
31.7 
5.9 
1.6 
[ 20.3 
8.4 
25.7 
3.3 
100.0 
50.0 
Taiwan 
1970 
3.3 
32.3 
7.9 
1.2 
23.2 
8.5 
23.3 
0.3 
100.0 
36.8 
1979 
1.2 
41.3 
10.2 
0.6 
19.5 
7.5 
19.7 
n.a. 
100.0 
21.5 
Annual Rates of Growth of Employment by Industry 
w 
CO 
Industry 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Utilities 
Commerce 
Finance 
Transport 
Services 
Unclassified 
Percentage of 
nonagricultural 
employment 
Agriculture as 
a percentage of 
total employment 
1961-76 
-13 .0 
4.1 
0.6 
- 4 . 3 
8.1 
9.2 
3.3 
0.6 
n.a. 
3.6 
- 3 . 8 
Hong Kong 
1961-71 
19.2 
3.7 
5.5 
- 7 . 3 
I 4.9 
3.2 
1.8 
n.a. 
3.6 
- 3 . 0 
1971-76 1963-78 
-53 .6 
4.8 
- 8 . 5 
1.9 
15.4 
3.5 
- 1 . 8 
n.a. 
3.7 
- 5 . 4 
4.0 
11.0 
9.9 
• 5.2 
n.a. 
7.2 
0.2 
Korea 
1963-70 
9.4 
10.7 
5.1 
6.4 
n.a. 
7.4 
- 0 . 3 
1970-78 
- 0 . 5 
11.3 
14.2 
4.2 
n.a. 
7.0 
0.7 
1957-79 
n.a. 
6.3 
4.2 
4.2 
[ 2.6 
4.1 
1.7 
n.a. 
3.8 
- 3 . 4 
Singapore 
1957-70 
n.a. 
4.9 
5.3 
5.1 
1.0 
3.7 
1.4 
n.a. 
2.8 
- 2 . 8 
1970-79 
n.a. 
8.3 
2.6 
2.9 
5.0 
13.5 
4.7 
2.2 
n.a. 
5.3 
- 4 . 3 
1964-79 
0.3 
8.5 
10.6 
- 0 . 4 
>6.4 
5.9 
4.8 
n.a. 
6.6 
- 2 . 2 
Taiwan 
1964-70 
9.1 
7.2 
12.2 
1.6 
9.3 
7.2 
5.2 
n.a. 
6.9 
- 2 . 3 
1970-79 
- 5 . 1 
9.4 
9.5 
- 1 . 8 
4.4 
4.9 
4.5 
n.a. 
6.4 
- 2 . 1 
Sources: For Hong Kong, Census 1961, table 238; Census 1971, table 11; Census 1976, table 13; Report on Labor Force Survey, Sept. 1980, table 
1.49. 
For Korea, Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook (1965 and 1979) and Economic Planning Board, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1981, table 
III.8, p. 83. 
For Singapore, Census 1970, table 10.48; Report on LF Survey 1979, table 44. 
For Taiwan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China (1980), Manpower, 
supplementary table 1. 
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Table 8.6. Employment by Activity Status (%) 
Employers 
Own account 
Employees 
On commission 
Permanent 
Casual 
Unpaid family workers 
Out worker 
Trainees & learners, 
miscellaneous 
Total 
Self-employed 
Unpaid family workers 
Employees 
Regular 
Temporary 
Daily 
Total 
Hong Kong 
1961 
0.8 
66.2 
11.5 
4.4 
0.9 
4.8 
10.4 
83.8 
0.9 
100.0 
Korea 
1963 
12.3 
6.5 
12.7 
37.2 
31.3 
31.5 
100.0 
1971 
0.4 
78.0 
6.3 
2.3 
0.3 
2.7 
8.6 
87.3 
1.4 
100.0 
1971 
23.1 
5.7 
10.5 
34.2 
26.5 
39.3 
100.0 
1980 
4.0 
5.8 
89.4 
85.4 
1.8 
2.2 
0.7 
100.0 
1980 
33.9 
18.8 
47.3 
30.4 
7.4 
9.5 
100.0 
Singapore 
1957 1970 1979 
Employers 
Own account 
Unpaid family workers 
Employees 
Total 
3.7 
17.5 
5.1 
73.7 
100.0 
2.8 
17.1 
3.6 
76.5 
100.0 
4.0 
9.3 
3.2 
83.5 
100.0 
Taiwan 
1956 1964 1970 1979 
Employers 
Own account 
Unpaid family workers 
Private employees 
Government employees 
Total 
3.2 
35.5 
24.4 
21.3 
15.5 
100.0 
2.4 
29.9 
28.5 
25.5 
13.7 
100.0 
2.8 
26.0 
20.3 
38.2 
12.5 
100.0 
4.1 
21.0 
11.2 
51.8 
11.9 
100.0 
Sources: For Hong Kong, Census 1961, table 215, Census 1971, table 8. Report on Labor 
Force Survey (September 1980), table 1.3. 
(source notes continued on facing page) 
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changed in Korea and declined in the other three countries. "Pull" rather 
than "push" forces were responsible for these changes; that is, rather than 
being forced from the land, labor willingly left agriculture to take jobs in 
expanding sectors, especially manufacturing. 
At present, the shares of agriculture in total employment are, not 
surprisingly, a great deal lower in the city-states than in the two larger 
countries: 1.4 percent in Hong Kong, 1.5 percent in Singapore, 21.5 
percent in Taiwan, and 34.0 percent in Korea. In fact, agriculture is still by 
far the largest employment sector in Korea. As for the industrial distribu-
tion of nonagricultural employment, manufacturing is now the single 
largest sector in each country, ranging from 29 percent in Singapore to 42 
percent in Hong Kong. In each case, commerce and services also consti-
tute a large share of employment. Other sectors are of relatively minor 
importance. 
Combining the information in tables 8.4 and 8.5, we find evidence that 
the composition of employment has shifted systematically in favor of 
higher-paying sectors. One such shift is the movement from agriculture 
into manufacturing which took place in each country. In as much as 
manufacturing wages are higher than agricultural wages, the rising share of 
manufacturing in total employment combined with the falling share of 
agriculture provides one piece of evidence of job upgrading. Other impor-
tant shifts are: the rising importance of employment in commerce and 
finance (high-wage industries) in Hong Kong; the diminishing importance 
of service employment (mixed evidence on whether service is a high-wage 
or low-wage industry) in Singapore; and the increasing share (as a propor-
tion of total employment) of employment in Taiwan's service sector (a 
high-wage industry). 
Employment by Activity Status. When economic development is success-
fully taking place, another dimension of structural change is to be found in 
the mix of jobs by activity status, i.e., a rising proportion of a country's 
labor force working as employees and smaller proportions engaged as 
own-account workers, unpaid family workers, and casual employees such 
as day workers. The data presented in table 8.6 indicate that such improve-
ments have occurred in the four Asian NICs. 
For Korea, Se-Il Park: Wages in Korea, table 5, p. 29. Economic Planning Board, Korea 
Statistical Yearbook, 1981, table III.2, p. 73. 
For Singapore, Population Census 1970, table 10.10; Report on Labor Force Survey, 1979, 
table 11. 
For Taiwan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Statistical Year-
book of the Republic of China, 1980, supplementary table 9, p. 24, and supplementary table 
3, p. 48. 
346 Gary S. Fields 
Employees constitute a considerably higher proportion of total employ-
ment in Hong Kong and Singapore than in Korea and Taiwan. By contrast, 
Korea and Taiwan have much larger proportions of their labor forces in 
own-account employment and unpaid family work than do Hong Kong and 
Singapore. These differences reflect the city-states' higher levels of na-
tional income and the consequent expansion of wage employment relative 
to the other activity status categories. 
Employment by Occupation. A third indicator of employment upgrading is 
the occupational structure of employment. Data on the current structure of 
earnings by occupation and on changes in the occupational distribution of 
employment are presented in tables 8.7 and 8.8 respectively. 
As in other developing economies, the occupations that earn the highest 
wages are administrative and managerial, and professional and technical. 
Those occupying intermediate pay positions are clerical, sales, and service 
occupations.5 Production workers are next lowest. Agricultural workers are 
at the bottom. 
The occupational structure of employment has shifted somewhat in favor 
of better-paying occupations. Agriculture is the lowest-paying sector, and 
the fraction of the labor force employed in that sector has diminished with 
economic development in each country. Many of the persons who left 
agriculture found jobs as production workers; the figure for production 
workers increased as a proportion of total nonagricultural employment in 
Korea and Taiwan and held steady in Hong Kong and Singapore, reflecting 
the fact that economic growth in Korea and Taiwan was based to a large 
degree on the production of manufactured goods for export. Professional 
and technical occupations, relatively high-income categories, expanded 
their shares of total employment, as is typical in the course of economic 
development. The rapid expansion of employment in professional, tech-
nical, and production employment caused service employment to expand 
less rapidly in the four Asian NICs than in many other developing econ-
omies. 
Employment by Education. A fourth indicator of employment upgrading is 
an improving educational level of the labor force. The evidence presented 
5. Service occupations and service industries occupy different earnings rankings. Service 
occupations are moderate to low-paying (table 8.7), whereas service industries pay relatively 
well (table 8.4). The difference is that service industries include government, medicine, law, 
and other high-paying activities, but government workers are in administrative and clerical 
occupation and doctors and lawyers are in professional occupations, not service occupations. 
Table 8.7. Structure of Earnings by Occupation 
CO 
Occupation 
Professional & technical 
Administrative & 
Clerical 
Sales 
Services 
Agricultural 
Production 
Not classified 
Total 
managerial 
Hong 
Kong 
1980" 
2,960 
4,380 
1,490 
1,470 
1,270 
1,070 
1,540 
1,350 
1,380 
Earnings 
Korea 
1980b 
266 
438 
177 
109 
115 
131 
118 
151 
in National Currency 
Sin; 
1977" 
846 
1,563 
412 
408 
266 
266 
289 
399 
gapore 
1979d 
J 342 
1 
117 
J 
} 97 
143 
Taiwan 
1979e 
163 
244 
122 
134 
111 
63 
90 
95 
105 
Hong 
Kong 
1980 
2.14 
3.17 
1.08 
1.07 
0.92 
0.78 
1.12 
0.98 
1.00 
Earnings 
Korea 
1980 
1.76 
2.91 
1.17 
0.72 
0.76 
0.87 
0.78 
1.00 
Index (Average = 1.00) 
Sin 
1977 
2.12 
3.93 
1.03 
1.02 
0.67 
0.67 
0.72 
1.00 
gapore 
1979 
}2.39 
1 
0.82 
J 
I0.68 
1.00 
Taiwan 
1979 
1.55 
2.32 
1.16 
1.28 
1.06 
0.60 
0.86 
0.90 
1.00 
Sources: For Hong Kong, Report on Labor Force Survey (September 1980), table 1.42. 
For Korea, Department of Labor Affairs, Report on Occupational Wage Survey, 1980. 
For Singapore, Report on the Survey of Households 1977, table 11; Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1979, table 28. 
For Taiwan, Report on the Survey of Personal Income, 1979, table 7. 
"Median monthly earnings (HK$). 
Mean monthly earnings (thousands of won); data based on survey of establishments. 
'Mean monthly earnings (S$). 
dMean weekly wages (S$); data based on survey of establishments. 
"Primary income per year per working income recipient (NTS thousands). 
Table 8.8. Shares of Employment in Various Occupations (%) 
Hong Kong Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Occupation 
Professional 
& technical 
Administrative 
& managerial 
Clerical 
Sales 
Services 
Production 
Agriculture 
Not classified 
Total 
1961 
4.7 
3.1 
6.0 
13.7 
15.1 
48.6 
7.7 
1.1 
100.0 
1971 
5.0 
4.6 
[l6.2 
14.9 
51.7 
3.6 
4.0 
100.0 
1976 
5.4 
2.1 
9.5 
11.3 
14.8 
52.4 
2.6 
1.9 
100.0 
1980 
6.1 
2.5 
13.1 
10.8 
17.5 
50.0 
1.4 
100.0 
1963 1970 
• 
2.5 
0.8 
3.5 
10.1 
5.4 
15.0 
63.0 
•4.7 
5.9 
12.3 
6.5 
20.3 
50.3 
100.0 100.0 
1980 
5.4 
9.4 
14.7 
8.1 
29.6 
32.9 
100.0 
1957 
4.8 
1.9 
11.9 
18.2 
15.6 
39.6 
7.8 
0.2 
100.0 
1970 
8.6 
1.7 
12.9 
16.2 
13.6 
39.3 
4.1 
3.6 
100.0 
1979 
8.6 
2.8 
15.8 
15.3 
11.1 
38.6 
1.8 
6.0 
100.0 
1964 
4.2 
2.7 
5.2 
10.3 
5.6 
23.0 
49.1 
100.0 
1970 
4.1 
3.1 
6.6 
13.1 
5.9 
30.7 
36.5 
100.0 
1979 
5.2 
0.9 
11.8 
12.1 
6.9 
41.9 
21.2 
100.0 
Sources: For Hong Kong, Census 1961, table 234; Census 1971, table 11; Census 1976, table 13; Report on Labor Force Survey, September 1980, 
table 1.4. 
For Korea, Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1965 ir 1979 and Economic Planning Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1981, table III. 2, 
pp. 72-73. 
For Singapore, Census 1970, table 10.56, Report on the Labor Force Survey, 1979, table 47. 
For Taiwan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1975, 1980, Manpower, 
Supplementary table 2. 
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in table 8.9 indicates large increases in the proportion of the work force that 
has secondary and higher levels of education and similar reductions in the 
proportion without education. It is difficult to decide how to interpret 
these changes, since educational upgrading is both a cause of economic 
growth and a consequence of it. Nonetheless, the fact that better-educated 
persons earn more than less-educated persons and are employed in higher 
occupational categories suggests that workers are now better off as a result 
of improved education. 
One anomaly emerging from table 8.9 is that the proportions of workers 
with university education are higher in Taiwan and Korea, the two poorer 
economies, than in Hong Kong and Singapore. Why did Taiwan and Korea 
invest more in human capital, and did they grow faster as a result? To 
answer these questions would be a study in itself. 
Real Wage Growth (Expressed in Terms of Real Monthly Earnings) 
We have seen that higher proportions of the populations are employed and 
the mix of jobs is improved. Are average real wages higher? Table 8.10 
speaks to this issue, and the answer is a definite yes. In Korea and Taiwan, 
real wages per worker doubled every 10 years. Real wages in Hong Kong 
grew by 150 percent in 20 years. These improvements are the envy of the 
rest of the world. In Singapore, however, wages grew less rapidly because 
of a deliberate government policy, until 1978, of restraining wages.6 The 
wage restraint policy was intended to maintain international competitive-
ness. Average real monthly earnings per worker failed to grow between 
1966 and 1975 in Singapore;7 but due to a doubling of the female labor force 
participation rate, and the falling unemployment rate, real wages per 
family increased by about 40 percent over the same time period.8 Begin-
ning in 1978, however, wage growth was encouraged by means of a "wage 
correction policy," and indeed real wages grew between 1978 and 1980 at 
rates comparable to those of the other three economies. The Singapore 
government allowed the wage correction policy to lapse in 1981. Singa-
pore's future wage policy is still under debate. 
In sum, Singapore's uneven experience notwithstanding, the overall 
record is one of rising real wages. Those who were employed earned more 
6. Essentially, the National Wages Council knowingly recommended that wages rise at 
below market rates. For further discussion of wage policy, see chapter 6 by Chia Siow Yue in 
this volume and the articles by Pang Eng Fong and Linda Lim and Pang Eng Fong cited in the 
notes to table 8.10. 
7. It is possible that natives' real wages rose while their places at the bottom were being 
taken by guest workers, but no statistics are available to test this proposition. 
8. The available wage figures for Singapore exclude employers' contributions to the 
Central Provident Fund. This is a substantial omission, inasmuch as the employer's rate of 
contribution has risen over time and now amounts to 22 percent of salary. 
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Table 8.9. Employment by Educational Attainment of Worker (%) 
No schooling 
Private tutor 
Primary 
Junior middle or 
lower secondary 
Senior middle or 
higher secondary 
Postsecondary 
University 
Total 
Hong Kong 
1961 
20.2 
6.4 
46.3 
13.6 
9.4 
1.4 
2.9 
100.0 
1971 
16.2 
5.5 
46.1 
12.2 
15.2 
1.9 
3.0 
100.0 
1976 
13.9 
[ 45.4 
15.8 
19.1 
2.2 
3.6 
100.0 
1980 
10.4 
38.1 
16.9 
24.5 
5.0 
4.4 
100.0 
Korea 
1960 1970 1980 
No schooling 
Elementary school 
Middle school 
High school 
University & college 
Total 
None 
Primary 
Secondary 
Upper secondary 
Tertiary 
Total 
44.7 
39.5 
7.3 
6.2 
2.4 
100.0 
Singapore 
1966 
54.1 
29.2 
[l3.3 
3.4 
100.0 
23.8 
43.6 
[ 26.4 
6.1 
100.0 
1972 
20.6 
36.9 
36.2 
4.4 
2.0 
100.0 
16.0 
35.5 
20.1 
21.8 
6.7 
100.0 
1977 
13.8 
35.2 
40.5 
7.7 
2.7 
100.0 
1980a 
22.5 
50.0 
16.2 
7.7 
3.6 
100.0 
Taiwan 
1965 1970 1975 1980 
Illiterate 
Primary 
Junior high & vocational 
Senior high & vocational 
University 
Total 
26.0 
54.3 
9.0 
7.5 
3.1 
100.0 
20.7 
52.7 
12.1 
10.5 
3.9 
100.0 
15.9 
47.9 
15.4 
14.7 
6.1 
100.0 
9.0 
39.6 
19.8 
20.8 
10.9 
100.0 
(Source notes on following page) 
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for their labor than workers a generation ago did. In Korea, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong, the rates of real-wage increase were substantially similar to 
the rates of increase of the GNP—an impressive record. 
Income Inequality 
The high and rising levels of inequality that characterize most other rapidly 
growing economies have been avoided for the most part in Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Taiwan. Some of the relevant data are presented in table 
8.11. 
The Gini coefficient of inequality in developing countries ranges from 
below .3 (low inequality) to above .6 (high inequality). By comparison, 
inequality is at low-to-moderate levels in the four Asian NICs. In fact, 
Taiwan has the most nearly equal income distribution of any developing 
country except Yugoslavia.9 In Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore, inequal-
ity levels are not high by international standards. 
Over time, since data first became available, inequality has fallen overall 
in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. These reductions in income in-
equality are impressive both when regarded in their own right and when 
matched against other countries' experiences. In the majority of other 
developing countries for which information is available, income inequality 
rose over time.'" Inequality in Singapore and Taiwan, however, has about 
leveled off; it is apparently rising in Hong Kong. This may portend a new 
era of less equitable growth, but it is too early to tell. As for Korea, 
inequality appears to have increased if the data are to be believed; but I am 
inclined to dismiss the Korea figures as too unreliable to be useful." 
9. World Bank, World Development Report 1980, table 24. 
10. See Gary S. Fields, "Poverty, Inequality, and Development: A Distributional 
Approach," Journal of Policy Modeling 3.3 (1981), table 2. 
11. Whether the data are to be believed is debatable. According to Chen, Hyper-Growth 
in Asian Economies, p. 156: "There are many estimates of personal distribution of income in 
Sources: For Hong Kong, Census 1961, table 236; Census 1970, table 10; By-Census 1976, 
table 17; Report on Labor Force Survey, September 1980, table 12. 
For Korea, Economic Planning Board, Population Census (1960 and 1970); and Survey on 
Economically Active Population. 
For Singapore, Census of Population 1980, Release No. 4, table 14, p. xxiv; and Reports on 
the Household Surveys, 1966, 1972, 1977. 
For Taiwan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Monthly Bulletin 
of Labor Statistics, Republic of China (October 1981), table 1.5; and Walter Galenson, "The 
Labor Force, Wages, and Living Standards," in Galenson, ed., Economic Growth and 
Structural Change in Taiwan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), table6.9, p. 396. 
"The 1980 census reports a much higher proportion of employees with less than secondary 
education than is reported from the earlier household surveys for 1966, 1972, and 1977, on 
which the figures for those years are based. 
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Absolute Poverty 
If relative income inequality is changing by only small amounts, and if 
inequality levels are low to moderate, it follows that the poor must have 
participated more or less proportionately in the fruits of development. And 
indeed, table 8.12 shows that poverty was reduced in all four economies. 
While poverty fell in most other developing economies it did not fall in all.12 
Undoubtedly, the main reason for the reduction of poverty in the four 
Asian NICs is that more people were employed in better-paying jobs.13 
Still, we must be careful to remember that these benefits are insufficient; 
much poverty remains. 
Industrialization and Employment 
A country's economic growth experience is related to its labor market in 
two important ways: product demand affects conditions in the labor mar-
ket, by way of the elementary relationship that the demand for labor is 
derived from the demand for product; and labor market conditions affect 
the product market, by way of the ability of firms to produce competitively 
in the world market. 
In this section, I offer empirical evidence in support of three proposi-
tions: 
1. In interindustry analysis in the four Asian NICs, employ-
ment growth is related directly to the growth of output and 
of exports. 
Korea. But they are mostly based on small samples and contain considerable biases, and since 
they are based on different methodology their degree of comparability is rather low." And 
Adelman and Robinson, Income Distribution Policy in Developing Countries, p. 48, state: 
"There are no acceptable data for the size distribution of income in Korea . . . " before the 
mid-seventies. On the other hand, in private correspondence, Robinson has expressed his 
confidence in the data since 1970, and a Korean economist, Hakchung Choo, has written 
extensively on income distribution change, at least through 1976. Although the estimates of 
relative inequality in Korea are based on the best available evidence, after reading all the 
qualifiers I conclude that we lack a firm enough statistical basis for inferring how income 
inequality has changed there. See Hakchung Choo, "Economic Growth and Income Distribu-
tion," in Chong Kee Park, ed., Human Resources and Social Development in Korea (Korea 
Development Institute, 1980), pp. 284-88. 
12. See Fields, "Poverty, Inequality, and Development, table 3. 
13. This claim follows from two facts. The first is that most families get most if not all of 
their incomes from the work they do. Second, decomposition studies from a number of 
countries including Taiwan indicate that labor-income inequality is the primary factor 
accounting for overall income inequality. The Taiwan evidence is presented by John C. H. 
Fei, Gustav Ranis, and Shirley W. Y. Kuo, "Growth and the Family Distribution of Income 
by Factor Components," Quarterly Journal of Economics (February 1978), pp. 17—53. This 
and other evidence is reviewed in Gary S. Fields, Poverty, Inequality, and Development 
(New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), especially pp. 111-14. 
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Table 8.10. Growth of Real Monthly Earnings 
Hong Kong 
Index of Average Real Monthly Manufacturing Wage, 1948 = 100 
1960 105 
1965 157 
1970 167 
1975 194 
1980 253 
Korea 
Index of Real Monthly Earnings, 1975 = 100 
1966 52 
1972 88 
1978 154 
1980 159 
Singapore 
Index of Real Monthly Earnings per Worker, 1970 = 100 
1960 90 
1970 100 
1980 120 
Taiwan" 
Index of Real Monthly Earnings in Manufacturing, 1954 = 100 
1954 100 
1960 102 
1970 183 
1979 400 
Sources: For Hong Kong, Steven Chow and Gustav Papanek, "Laissez Faire, Growth, and 
Equity—Hong Kong," The Economic Journal (June 1981), p. 475; and Commissioner for 
Labour Annual Department Report, various issues. 
For Korea, Wontack Hong, "Export Promotion . . . ," pp. 377-78; and Economic Planning 
Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook (1981), tables XIV. 1, p. 407, and XIV. 12, pp. 436-37. 
For Singapore, V. V. Bhanoji Rao and M. K. Ramakrishnan, Income Inequality in Singa-
pore (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1980); and 1980 Singapore Yearbook of Labor 
Statistics, tables 27 and 196; Pang Eng Fong, "Economic Development and the Labor Market 
in a Newly-Industrializing Country: The Experience of Singapore," The Developing Econo-
mies (March 1981); and Linda Lim and Pang Eng Fong, Trade, Employment and Indus-
trialization in Singapore (International Labor Organization, 1982). 
For Taiwan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Statistical Year-
book of the Republic of China, 1980, table 18, p. 448; Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1980, 
table 9-1, p. 165. 
"Data available for manufacturing only. 
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Table 8.11. Changes in Relative Income Inequality in the Four Asian Newly 
Industrialized Countries 
Hong Kong 
Ratio of Income Share of Richest 20% of 
Gini Coefficient among Households Households to Poorest 20%a 
1966 
1971 
1976 
1981 
I1' 
.487 
.411 
.435 
.447 
IP 
.50 
.45 
.44 
1966 
1971 
1976 
10.9 
9.9 
9.8 
Korea 
Ratio of Income Share of Richest 20% of 
Gini Coefficient among Households Households to Poorest 20% 
1965 
1970 
1976 
.34 
.33 
.38 
1965 
1970 
1976 
Singapore 
7.3 
5.7 
7.6 
Gini Coefficient among Individuals 
1966 
1975 
1980 
.499 
.452 
.455 
Taiwan 
Ratio of Income Share of Richest 20% of 
Gini Coefficient among Households Households to Poorest 20% 
Earlv 1950s 
1968-72 
1976-78 
.5 
.3 
.27 
1964 
1972 
1979 
5.3 
4.5 
4.3 
Sources: For Hong Kong: 
"Steven Chow and Gustav Papanek, "Laissez Faire, Growth, and Equity—Hong Kong," 
The Economic Journal (June 1981), table 4. 
bRonald Hsia and Laurence Chau, Industrialization, Employment and Income (London: 
Croom Helm, 1978), 1976 and 1981 Censuses. 
For Korea, Hakchung Choo, "Economic Growth and Income Distribution," in Chong Kee 
Park, ed., Human Resources and Social Development in Korea (Korea Development Insti-
tute, 1980), table 3, p. 289. 
For Singapore, Unpublished materials provided by Economic Research Centre, National 
University of Singapore. 
For Taiwan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Report on the 
Survey of Family Income Distribution in Taiwan Area, cited in Paul Liu, "Determinants of 
Income Inequality Over Family Development Cycle," Academia Economic Papers (March 
1981), p. 100; and Council for Economic Planning and Development, Economic Develop-
ment, Taiwan, Republic of China, p. 46. 
Note: The Gini coefficient measures income inequality. A higher Gini coefficient signifies 
greater inequality. The Gini coefficient has the value zero when income is distributed 
perfectly equally. It has the value 1 when one income recipient has all the income and the rest 
have none. 
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Table 8.12. Changes in Absolute Poverty in the Four Asian Newly Industrializing 
Countries (%) 
Hong Kong 
Proportion of Households with Annual Incomes Less than HK$3,000 
(in constant 1966 HK$) 
1966 18 
1971 11 
1976 7 
Korea 
Proportion of Households with Incomes below a Constant Real Poverty Linea 
1965 41 
1970 23 
1976 15 
Singapore 
Proportion of Persons with Incomes below S$200 per Month 
(in 1975 prices) 
1966 37 
1975 29 
1980 18 
Taiwan 
Proportion of Households with Incomes below Specified Amount in Specified Year 
NT$20,000 (constant) 
1964 35 
1972 10 
NT$30,000 (constant) 
1964 55 
1972 20 
NT$40,000 (constant) 
1964 80 
1972 35 
Sources: For Korea, Sang Mok Suh, "The Patterns of Poverty," in Chong Kee Park, ed., 
Human Resources and Social Development in Korea (Korea Development Institute, 1980), 
p. 350. 
For Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, computed from sources cited in table 8.11. 
'Poverty lines are defined separately for rural and urban households. These figures, based 
on dietary requirements and Engel curves, amounted to 12,930 won per person per month for 
urban households and 10,853 won for rural households. 
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2. Also in interindustry analysis in the four Asian NICs, em-
ployment growth, output growth, and export growth are 
related inversely to wage growth, apparently for market 
reasons. 
3. In comparative analysis, high rates of wage growth, ap-
parently for institutional reasons, cause low or even nega-
tive rates of growth of employment, output, and exports. 
Growth of Output, Exports, and Employment 
by Manufacturing Sector 
There can be no doubt that the improvements in employment, wages, and 
income distribution in the four Asian NICs were due to economic growth. 
In particular, if we wish to relate employment expansion to growth of 
output and growth of exports, the natural starting point is to identify those 
industries that are major employers and/or those that have experienced 
major changes in employment. The three industries that stand out in this 
regard, based on the data in table 8.13, are: 
Metal Products.14 This sector is noteworthy because it is the largest em-
ployment sector in Singapore and Taiwan and the second largest in Hong 
Kong and Korea and because it is the fastest-growing sector of employ-
ment. Metal products increased in importance in all four economies, its 
share of manufacturing employment rising from 13 percent to 27 percent in 
Hong Kong, from 12 percent to 28 percent in Korea, from 20 percent to 55 
percent in Singapore, and from 20 percent to 33 percent in Taiwan. 
Textiles and Garments. This sector is noteworthy because of its large size. 
It is the single most important employment sector in Hong Kong and 
Korea, and the second most important in Singapore and Taiwan. In Singa-
pore, textiles employment increased at an annual rate of 20 percent during 
the sixties and seventies, resulting in a quadrupling of textiles' employ-
ment share. The textiles sector held its own in the other three countries, 
keeping pace with employment growth in the rest of manufacturing. 
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco. This sector is noteworthy because of its 
declining importance. Its shares of manufacturing employment fell from 14 
percent to 3 percent in Hong Kong, from 16 percent to 9 percent in Korea, 
from 19 percent to 5 percent in Singapore, and from 13 percent to 7 percent 
in Taiwan. 
14. The metal products industry includes such items as metallic products, machinery, 
parts, appliances, electronics, electrical machinery, shipbuilding, motor vehicles, and preci-
sion instruments. 
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In sum, relative employment shares are large and growing in metal 
products, large and steady in textiles and garments, and small and declin-
ing in food, beverages, and tobacco. And as I shall now show, these 
employment patterns accord with the growth of output and of exports in 
each sector in the four economies. 
Take the case of the metal products industry first. Metal products was a 
growth industry in employment terms in every country. As shown in table 
8.14, the structure of manufacturing production also shifted in favor of 
metal products in each case. When these increases in the metal product 
share of manufacturing production are combined with the rising impor-
tance of manufacturing production in total national product, the growth of 
production in that sector is all the greater. 
To a large extent, the metal products sector expanded output for export 
purposes. Direct evidence on this is available for two of the countries. In 
Hong Kong, the share of metal product output that was exported nearly 
doubled, rising from 37 percent to 66 percent. In Singapore, the situation 
was nearly identical: machinery and transport (the closest category to metal 
products) exported 33 percent of its production in 1960, 69 percent in 
1979.15 
The same is true of the volume and composition of exports. In all four 
countries, the value of machinery and transport exports increased enor-
mously from 1960 to the late seventies: from US$77 million to $9,314 
million in Hong Kong, from US$0.9 million to $2,587 million in Korea, 
from US$15.5 million to $5,068 million in Singapore, and from US$2 
million to $4,500 in Taiwan. As a result of these increases, the shares of 
machinery and transport exports in total exports grew rapidly: from 3 
percent of the total to 17 percent in Hong Kong, from 2 percent to 20 
percent in Korea, from 8 percent to 28 percent in Singapore, and from 1 
percent to 28 percent in Taiwan. 
It is apparent that foreign trade was a driving force underlying the 
expansion of employment in the metal products sector in each country. All 
took advantage of export opportunities and increased the value of metal 
products exports enormously. As firms increased output for the export 
market, they also expanded employment. The result was a trade-induced 
increase in metal products employment, offering hundreds of thousands of 
new modern-sector jobs that did not exist previously. 
The situation was similar in textiles, though the precise figures are 
different. In brief, textile employment grew at rapid rates as did textile 
production and exports. In Taiwan, for example, in the sixties and seven-
ties, textile employment grew at an annual rate of 8.3 percent, textile 
15. These percentages are for domestic exports, excluding entrepot. 
00 
Table 8.13. Changes in the Structure of Employment by Manufacturing Sector 
Sector 
Food, beverages, 
& tobacco 
Textile, garments, 
leather & footwear 
Wood & furniture 
Paper & printing 
Chemicals, petroleum, 
rubber, & plastics 
Nonmetallic minerals 
Basic metals 
Metal products 
Miscellaneous 
Hong Kong" 
1961 
14.2 
45.2 
6.3 
5.4 
12.0 
1.9 
1.7 
[l3.4 
1977 
2.6 
47.8 
2.2 
4.2 
11.9 
0.5 
0.5 
27.1 
3.1 
1961 
15.7 
35.4 
6.0 
7.4 
12.1 
6.0 
2.5 
12.5 
2.2 
Percentage Distribution 
Korea 
1970 
13.6 
31.1 
5.2 
5.7 
11.8 
5.9 
3.7 
17.4 
5.6 
1979 
8.8 
30.4 
3.6 
4.4 
12.1 
4.8 
4.3 
28.2 
3.5 
1960 
19.1 
4.0 
8.8 
13.7 
23.7 
7.3 
1.5 
20.4 
1.5 
of Employment 
Singaporeb 
1970 
10.0 
15.8 
8.8 
7.7 
11.8 
3.8 
1.2 
34.5 
6.5 
1979 
5.2 
15.6 
6.3 
5.7 
7.8 
1.6 
0.8 
54.7 
2.2 
1966 
12.7 
21.5 
6.0 
5.6 
13.1 
| 14.9 
20.1 
6.1 
Taiwanc 
1975 
10.1 
25.2 
5.4 
4.5 
16.2 
8.3 
26.0 
4.3 
1981 
6.7 
21.9 
6.7 
4.8 
13.2 
4.3 
3.0 
33.4 
5.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Annual Rate of Growth of Employment by Manufacturing Sector 
w 
VI 
CD 
Sector 
Food, beverages, 
& tobacco 
Textile, garments, 
leather & footwear 
Wood & furniture 
Paper & printing 
Chemicals, petroleum, 
rubber & plastics 
Nonmetallic minerals 
Basic metals 
Metal products 
Miscellaneous 
All products 
Hong Kong 
1961-77 
- 7 . 5 
3.3 
- 3 . 7 
1.4 
2.9 
- 4 . 7 
- 4 . 0 
[8.3 
2.9 
1961-79 
8.4 
11.0 
8.8 
8.8 
12.0 
10.5 
15.2 
17.2 
19.9 
12.0 
Korea 
1970-79 
5.3 
10.2 
5.9 
7.3 
10.9 
8.0 
12.3 
16.6 
5.0 
10.5 
1961-70 
11.7 
11.9 
11.8 
10.4 
13.2 
13.1 
18.2 
17.7 
25.6 
13.5 
1960-79 
4.4 
20.1 
9.8 
6.7 
5.4 
3.2 
8.1 
17.7 
14.1 
11.7 
Singapore 
1970-79 
1.4 
8.8 
5.0 
5.4 
4.2 
- 1 . 0 
4.3 
14.7 
- 3 . 1 
9.0 
1960-70 
7.1 
31.3 
14.3 
7.9 
6.5 
7.2 
11.6 
20.5 
32.1 
14.3 
Taiwanc 
1966-75 
3.7 
8.3 
5.1 
3.8 
8.9 
I - 0 . 3 
9.5 
2.2 
6.4 
1975-81 
4.7 
9.5 
16.1 
13.4 
8.3 
9.7 
16.9 
18.4 
12.1 
Sources: For Hong Kong, Census 1961, table 231, The Commissioner for Labor 1977 Departmental Report, table IB. 
For Korea, Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1972, table 111; 1963, table 182 and Economic Planning Board, Korea StatisticalYearbook 
1981, table V.2, pp. 162-63. 
For Singapore, Report on the Census of Industrial Production, 1979, table 13; 1960, table 2.1. 
For Taiwan, Walter Galenson, "The Labor Force, Wages and Living Standards," in Galenson, ed., Economic Growth and Structural Change in 
Taiwan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), table 6.4; and Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Monthly Bulletin of 
Labor Statistics, Republic of China (October 1981), table 1.6. 
aData for 1977 covers only registered establishments (about 90% of all employment in manufacturing); data for 1961 is from Population Census. 
bRubber processing is included in chemicals, petroleum, rubber, and plastics; this activity accounted for 16.7% of manufacturing employment in 
1960, 3.7% in 1970, and 0.7% in 1979. 
c1975 and 1981 figures are derived from different sources and so may not be directly comparable. 
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Table 8.14. Changing Structure of Manufacturing Production 
Hong Kong" 
Food, beverages, & tobacco 
Textiles & clothing 
Wood & furniture 
Paper & printing 
Leather & rubber 
Chemicals & plastics 
Nonmetallic minerals 
Basic metals 
Metal products 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
Output 
(HK$ 
millions) 
1960/61 
486.1 
1,910.0 
162.4 
202.3 
70.9 
203.3 
66.4 
26.3 
877.9 
721.1 
4,452.5 
Sales 
(HK$ millions) 
1971 
1,058.0 
8,726.4 
379.4 
676.2 
239.7 
2,016.9 
118.7 
337.0 
3,356.5 
1,140.1 
18,048.9 
1978 
2,837 
27,883 
1,031 
2,585 
534 
5,726 
898 
1,042 
18,882 
2,312 
63,729 
1960/61 
10.9 
42.9 
3.6 
4.5 
1.6 
4.6 
1.5 
0.6 
19.7 
16.2 
100.0 
% Distribution 
1971 
5.9 
48.3 
2.1 
3.7 
1.3 
11.2 
0.7 
1.9 
18.6 
6.3 
100.0 
1978 
4.5 
43.8 
1.6 
4.1 
0.8 
9.0 
1.4 
1.6 
29.6 
3.6 
100.0 
Exports/ 
Output 
1960/61 
37.0 
81.0 
22.6 
19.9 
83.1 
26.0 
29.0 
80.0 
36.7 
67.0 
62.0 
(%)b 
1971 
25.1 
71.6 
45.4 
12.0 
75.1 
76.6 
24.4 
16.9 
65.9 
82.1 
65.0 
w 
CT> 
h-1 
Food, beverages, & tobacco 
Textiles & leather 
Wood & furniture 
Paper & printing 
Chemicals, oil, coal, rubber, & plastics 
Nonmetallic minerals 
Basic metals 
Metal products, machinery, & equipment 
Others 
Total 
Korea 
Value Added 
(billion won) 
1961 1970 
4.2 
6.4 
1.4 
1.7 
2.9 
2.0 
0.5 
2.3 
0.4 
21.8 
141 
94 
19 
28 
121 
33 
22 
76 
16 
550 
1979 1961 
1,523 19.3 
1,807 29.4 
218 6.4 
399 7.8 
1,607 13.3 
530 9.2 
731 2.3 
2,225 10.6 
169 1.8 
9,208 100.0 
Distribution 
1970 1979 
25.6 16.5 
17.1 19.6 
3.5 2.4 
5.1 4.3 
22.0 17.5 
6.0 5.8 
4.0 7.9 
13.8 24.2 
2.9 1.8 
100.0 100.0 
Table continues on the following pages, notes to table are on page 363. 
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Table 8.14. Changing Structure of Manufacturing Production (Continued) 
Singapore 
Direct Exports as 
Value Addedc Proportion of Value 
(US$ millions) % Distribution of Production 
1960 1970 1977 1960 1970 1979 1960 1970 1979 
Food, beverages, & tobacco 
Textiles, leather, & footwear 
Wood products & furniture 
Paper & printing 
Chemicals, petroleum, & plastics 
Nonmetallic mineral products 
Basic metals 
Machinery & electrical products 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
Rubber-processing 
Total 
44.1 136.0 
4.4 56.3 
11.4 71.1 
26.4 63.5 
13.0 292.0 
5.5 33.3 
1.9 22.2 
33.6 390.4 
1.8 28.9 
142.1 1,093.7 
42.9 35.0 
185.0 1,128.8 
369.9 31.0 12.4 
397.8 3.1 5.1 
278.2 8.0 6.5 
288.2 18.6 5.8 
1,692.1 9.1 26.7 
167.8 3.9 3.0 
128.3 1.3 2.0 
3.274.3 23.6 35.7 
106.8 1.3 2.6 
6.703.4 100.0 100.0 
87.7 23.2 3.1 
6,791.0 100.0 100.0 
5.5 
5.9 
4.2 
4.3 
25.2 
2.4 
1.9 
48.8 
1.6 
100.0 
1.3 
100.0 
28.1 
29.8 
46.4 
22.2 
51.4 
60.2 
57.4 
32.6 
3.7 
35.0 
73.6 
63.2 
28.3 
53.5 
41.5 
14.0 
45.2 
28.1 
21.1 
41.9 
30.5 
39.1 
72.1 
44.3 
44.9 
62.3 
55.2 
14.7 
71.1 
23.3 
41.6 
68.5 
42.1 
64.1 
59.9 
63.4 
Taiwan 
w 
w Food, beverages, & tobacco 
Textile & apparel 
Wood & furniture 
Paper & printing 
Leather & rubber 
Chemicals 
Petroleum & coal 
Nonmetallic mineral 
Basic metal 
Metal products & machinery, electrical products 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
1951 
505 
288 
64 
114 
37 
236 
56 
64 
6 
79 
63 
1,512 
Manufacturing GDP 
(NT$ millions) 
1960 
3,016 
1,530 
495 
811 
145 
629 
512 
760 
387 
1,073 
138 
9,496 
1970 
8,685 
9,489 
2,494 
2,600 
649 
6,419 
4,760 
2,737 
1,301 
11,251 
2,162 
52,547 
1979 
30,252 
55,332 
16,103 
18,445 
10,745 
40,841 
16,038 
14,382 
26,754 
93,421 
34,952 
357,265 
1951 
33.4 
19.0 
4.2 
7.5 
2.4 
15.6 
3.7 
4.2 
0.4 
5.2 
4.2 
100.0 
Percentage 
1960 
31.8 
16.1 
5.2 
8.5 
1.5 
6.6 
5.4 
8.0 
4.1 
11.3 
1.5 
100.0 
Distribution 
1970 
16.5 
18.1 
4.7 
4.9 
1.2 
12.2 
9.1 
5.2 
2.5 
21.4 
4.1 
100.0 
1979 
8.5 
15.5 
4.5 
5.2 
3.0 
11.4 
4.5 
4.0 
7.5 
26.1 
9.8 
100.0 
Sources: For Hong Kong, 1960/61: Laurence C. Chau, "Estimates of Hong Kong Domestic Product, 1959-1969," Hong Kong Economic Papers 7 
(1972), p. 18; 1971: Census and Statistics Department, 1971 Census of Manufacturing Establishments. 1978: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics 
(January 1981), p. 88. 
For Korea, Bank of Korea: Economic Statistics Yearbook (1963), table 183, pp. 300-01, and Economic Statistics Yearbook (1972), table 111, pp. 
216-16. 
For Singapore, Census of Industrial Production, various issues; Economic Development Board Report (1972). 
For Taiwan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, National Income of the Republic of China (December 1980), ch. 4, table 2. 
"Data based on Mining & Manufacturing Census, which excludes establishments with fewer than 5 workers. 
bData for 1978 are not available. 
cEstablishments with ten or more employees. 
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output grew from NT$1,530 million to $55,332 million, and textile exports 
grew from US$28 million to $5,226 million in value and from 17 percent to 
33 percent in share. 
On the other hand, in food, beverages, and tobacco, the growth rates of 
employment, output, and exports were all much lower. In three of the 
countries (Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), employment in that sector grew 
but at below-average rates; in the fourth (Hong Kong), absolute employ-
ment actually fell. In all four, production in food, beverages, and tobacco 
increased absolutely but fell in relative terms. The situation is similar with 
respect to exports: the absolute value of food, beverage, and tobacco 
exports increased but relative shares declined in all four countries. 
We may conclude from this evidence that economic growth of the rate 
and character realized in the four Asian NICs had large direct effects on 
employment. By tapping export markets, these NICs succeeded in raising 
output in key sectors of the economy at rapid rates. Because this export-led 
growth was of a labor-intensive character, employment also grew rapidly. 
Employment growth rates varied directly with the growth rates of output 
and exports in these three industries. 
Wage Growth and Employment Growth: Market Forces 
In contrast to the positive relationship between employment growth, 
output growth, and export growth, if we look at wage change in the same 
three industries (see table 8.15), we find a clear inverse relationship 
between the rates of employment growth and real wage growth: 
Metal products: Employment growth in each country has been at above-
average rates compared to manufacturing as a whole. Wage growth, 
however, has been at a rate less than or equal to the rate of wage increase 
overall. 
Textiles, garments, leather, and footwear: The story here is similar to 
metal products but the numbers are slightly different. Employment 
growth in textiles has been at average or above-average rates: equal to 
employment growth in Korean manufacturing as a whole, twice as high as 
the average in Singapore, and one-third higher than the average in Taiwan. 
Wage growth in each country has been at a rate below the rate of wage 
increases in manufacturing as a whole. 
Food, beverages, and tobacco: This sector presents the opposite picture 
from metal products and textiles. Employment growth has been at average 
or below-average rates. In each country, however, wage growth has been 
at average or above-average rates. 
Table 8.15. Changes in Employment and Wages by Manufacturing Sector, Three Countries (excluding Hong Kong because of 
noncomparability) 
w 
en 
Manufacturing 
Food, beverages, & tobacco 
Textiles, garments, leather, 
& footwear 
Wood & furniture 
Paper & printing 
Chemicals, petroleum, 
rubber, & plastics 
Nonmetallic minerals 
Basic metals 
Metal products 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
Korea* 
Employment 
Struc-
ture 
1977 
8.8 
34.3 
3.7 
4.4 
12.4 
4.0 
3.7 
24.4 
4.2 
100.0 
Growth 
1961-79 
8.4 
11.0 
8.8 
8.8 
12.0 
10.5 
15.2 
17.2 
14.9 
12.0 
Wages 
Struc-
ture 
1978 
1.15 
0.75 
1.02 
1.34 
1.14 
1.27 
1.51 
1.09 
0.76 
1.00 
Growth 
1960-78 
10.2 
7.5 
8.2 
9.7 
9.6 
10.5 
9.9 
9.1 
8.3 
9.0 
Singapore13 
Employment 
Struc-
ture 
1979 
5.2 
15.6 
6.3 
5.7 
7.8 
1.6 
0.8 
54.7 
2.2 
100.0 
Growth 
1960-79 
4.4 
20.1 
9.8 
6.7 
5.4 
3.2 
8.1 
17.7 
14.1 
11.7 
Wages 
Struc-
ture 
1978 
1.11 
0.64 
0.88 
1.05 
1.36d 
1.26 
1.51 
1.05 
0.77 
1.00 
S 
Taiwan0 
Employment 
truc-
Growth ture 
1960-78 1975 
3.7 
1.3 
1.1 
2.1 
5.1d 
4.1 
5.0 
1.8 
3.0 
10.1 
25.2 
5.4 
4.5 
16.2 
•8.3 
26.0 
4.3 
2.5 100.0 
Growth 
1966-75 
3.7 
8.3 
5.1 
3.8 
8.9 
1-0.3 
9.5 
2.2 
6.4 
Wages 
Struc-
ture 
1979 
1.05 
0.82 
0.90 
1.13 
1.15 
1.02 
1.34 
1.05 
0.83 
1.00 
Growth 
1960-79 
8.0 
7.5 
8.5 
6.5 
8.1 
6.1 
9.0 
7.0 
7.0 
8.0 
Note: Employment structure: percentage distribution. 
Employment growth: annual rate of growth. 
Wage structure: ratio of wages to average. 
Wage growth: annual rate of growth of real earnings. 
"Monthly earnings of regular employees; Bank of Korea: Economic Statistics Yearbook (1972), table 159; (1979) table 138. Employment: see table 8.5. 
bAnnual employee renumerations: Report on the Census of Industrial Production (1960), table 5.1; (1970) tables 1 and 12; (1978) tables 22 and 26. 
Employment: see table 8.5. 
'Earnings Data: Computed from Statistical Yearbook 1980, table 181. Earnings within each sector are an unweighted average of subsectors. 
Employment: See table 8.5. 
dIncludes rubber-processing. 
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How is the inverse relationship between employment growth and wage 
growth to be explained? Take first the metal products and textile indus-
tries: I infer that relatively low wage growth in those industries permitted 
high employment growth in each country. Relatively low wage growth, 
however, still meant that wage increases ranged from 1.3 percent per 
annum in Singapore textiles to 9.1 percent in Korean metal products. And 
remember that these are real wage increases. That is, growing demand for 
labor pulled up real wages; workers already in those industries benefited, 
plus large numbers of additional workers were employed at higher wages. 
On the other side of the coin, how can the high rates of wage increase in 
food, beverages, and tobacco be reconciled with the below-average growth 
of employment in that industrial group in each country (and, for that 
matter, with the below-average growth of output and exports of food, 
beverages, and tobacco products)? One is tempted to look for some sort of 
institutional force that pushed wages up prematurely, leading firms to 
reduce their rates of employment, export, and output expansion, if not 
actually to cut them all back. But the actual cause appears to be quite 
different: capital-labor substitution. 
The success of the four Asian NICs with labor-intensive, export-led 
growth has led to full employment and even labor shortages. The tight 
labor market situation has generated stiff competition for labor. In metal 
products and textiles as in most industries, firms responded by raising 
wages in order to hold their existing labor forces and attract new workers. 
But some firms, especially in food, beverages, and tobacco industry, 
responded to rising wages by shifting to more capital-intensive production 
methods (e.g., automated bottling plants), the technology for which could 
readily be obtained in the United States, Japan, and elsewhere. This 
capital-intensive growth was accompanied by a shift in the skill mix of 
employment in food, beverages, and tobacco, as skilled labor was hired and 
unskilled workers trained to man the machines. This claim is based on case 
studies. No figures are available on educational qualifications of various 
industry work forces. In support of this claim of a higher skill mix in food, 
beverages, and tobacco than in textiles or metal products, however, figures 
on production and employment may be combined to give indices of "pro-
ductivity" (see table 8.16). Workers in food, beverages, and tobacco 
exhibit higher productivity, in part because they are thought to be bet ter 
skilled. Since firms have to pay skilled workers more than unskilled work-
ers, wages are even higher. As physical and human capital replaced un-
skilled labor in production, total costs increased. This provides a consistent 
market explanation for the relatively rapid growth of wages and the re-
latively slow growth of employment, exports, and output in food, bever-
ages, and tobacco. 
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Table 8.16. Index of Productivity in Selected Industries Around 1979 
(Food, Beverages, and Tobacco in Each Country = 100) 
Industry Hong Kong" Koreab Singaporeb Taiwan0 
Food, beverages, and tobacco 100 100 100 100 
Textiles 53 34 35 60 
Metal products 64 40 85 18 
Source: Computed from tables 8.13 and 8.14. 
"Sales per worker. 
bValue added per worker. 
CGNP per worker. 
We may conclude that wage growth was inversely related to growth of 
employment, output, and exports because of market forces. Where sub-
stitution of capital for labor could take place, it did. Labor was redeployed 
to areas of greatest need. And because other sectors of the economy 
needed workers in order to grow, full employment of labor in the economy 
was maintained. 
The Importance of the Wage-Setting Process 
Wage and employment growth are high in the four Asian NICs, higher 
than elsewhere. How can these differences be explained? One possible 
explanation—that the differences in their labor market experience are due 
to their respective macroeconomic experience—is far too superficial. 
Although it is accurate in an accounting sense, it is not an explanation. It 
only pushes the question one step further back and leads us to ask: why 
were their growth experiences different? 
Some analysts explain the four Asian NICs' successes in terms of cultural 
differences (i.e., the Confucian ethic). Clearly, cultural factors do have a 
role to play, but can they be that important? Political economists would 
point elsewhere: to the willingness of the major capitalist powers to permit 
and even aid the development of other capitalist economies. Others would 
focus on the character of foreign trade and foreign investment. The Asian 
NICs have relied on exports for a major part of their economic growth and 
their exports have two key attributes: they are produced using labor-
intensive methods, and the export industries have strong linkages with the 
rest of the economy. Contrast this with countries which rely on land-based 
or mineral-based export industries. Often, these industries are highly 
intensive in capital and energy and have few intersectoral linkages. 
Another factor that bears mention is the relatively equal distribution of 
assets, both physical and human, that characterized these economies at the 
beginning of their take-offs into rapid economic growth. 
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While all these factors undoubtedly contribute to explaining why the 
four Asian NICs have been more successful than other countries, I would 
like to call attention to one other difference that has been largely over-
looked: differences in the wage-setting process between these NICs and 
the rest of the world. The key sector to focus on is manufacturing, since 
growth of manufacturing exports is the driving force behind the four Asian 
NICs' economic growth. The manufacturing wage in those four countries is 
about 20 percent higher than the agricultural wage. By contrast, through-
out Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, wages are more than twice 
as high in manufacturing as in agriculture. 
The difference has to do with the wage-setting mechanisms at work. 
Four institutional forces, singly or in combination, have potent influences 
on manufacturing wages outside of East Asia.16 Minimum wage laws are 
commonplace and when enforced cause wages to be higher than they 
otherwise would be. Labor unions often are very strong. At times, this is 
because of the close association between organized labor and the political 
party in power. At other times, it is because labor unions are encouraged as 
a means of achieving higher wages for workers. Government pay policy 
often sets the pattern of wages for the rest of the economy, and those in 
charge have a propensity to pay high wages to all government workers 
(including themselves). Lastly, multinationals often pay high wages, partly 
to maintain parity between expatriate and local employees, and partly (in 
some instances) to appear to be good corporate citizens and thereby to 
avoid expropriation or expulsion. 
The striking feature about wage-setting in Hong Kong, Korea, Singa-
pore, and Taiwan is the absence of such institutional forces. Economic 
development in the four Asian NICs has been based on low labor costs. 
16. Among the relevant studies of wage structure and institutional aspects of wage setting 
in less developed countries are Elliot Berg, "Major Issues of Wage Policies in Africa," in A. 
M. Ross, ed., Industrial Relations and Economic Development (New York: Macmillan, 1966); 
Elliot Berg, "Wage Structure in Less Developed Countries," in A. D. Smith, ed., Wage 
Policy Issues in Economic Development (London: Macmillan, 1969); Lloyd G. Reynolds, 
"Wages and Employment in a Labor Surplus Economy," American Economic Review (March 
1965); Lloyd G. Reynolds, "Relative Earnings and Manpower Allocation in Developing 
Economies," The Pakistan Development Review (Spring, 1969); Michael P. Todaro, "Income 
Expectations, Rural-Urban Migration and Employment in Africa," International Labour 
Review (November 1971); Michael P. Todaro, International Migration in Developing Coun-
tries (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1976); David Turnham, The Employment Problem 
in Less Developed Countries (Paris: Development Centre of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 1971); Gene M. Tidrick, "Wage Spillover and Unemploy-
ment in a Wage-Gap Economy: The Jamaican Case," Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 1975; John B. Knight and Richard H. Sabot, Why Wages Differ (Washington: World 
Bank, 1980); and Gary S. Fields, Analyzing Income Inequality in Colombia: A Micro Perspec-
tive, mimeo, 1981. 
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These countries recognized that if they were first to penetrate and then to 
hold their positions in the world markets, they would have to do so on the 
basis of price, taking advantage of their abundant supplies of labor. Accord-
ingly, they pursued a variety of policies which had the effect of restraining 
wage growth. The four institutional forces causing higher-than-market-
clearing wages elsewhere—trade unions, minimum wage laws, govern-
ment pay policy, and multinational corporations—do not interfere with 
market wage setting in the four Asian NICs. Although trade unions bargain 
over wages, only in Hong Kong do they do so free of government restraint. 
Minimum wage laws are on the books in some of the countries, but the 
minimum wage is below the market wage and is therefore irrelevant. 
Government pay policy in each country is to follow the private sector, not 
to lead it as it does in other developing regions, especially Africa. And 
multinationals, too, follow market forces.17 The result is that wages increase 
in the four Asian NICs if, and only if, firms find it in their profit-maximizing 
interest to raise them, after taking full account of the need to hold costs 
down to internationally competitive levels. 
I see these differences in wage-setting processes—supply and demand in 
the four Asian NICs, institutional wage determination elsewhere—as a 
major reason for the differential rates of economic success between the four 
Asian NICs on the one hand and the rest of the developing world on the 
other. For obvious reasons, higher wages raise input costs, and this is likely 
to result in reduced exports and hence lower output, unless either (1) 
higher wages cause higher productivity, and/or (2) the wage bill increases 
so much that domestic demand increases faster than foreign demand falls 
off. 
Consider next the employment effects of the different wage-setting 
mechanisms. Simple supply-and-demand analysis suffices to show that a 
higher-than-market-clearing wage causes employment to be less than it 
might otherwise be if wages were set at market-clearing levels, because 
employers hire fewer workers when wages are greater. The wage elasticity 
of demand for labor would be especially high in an open economy because 
higher costs (unless accompanied by higher productivity) may result in 
large losses of export sales. 
Next, consider inequality. Quite simply, if everyone in the labor force is 
employed at a market-clearing wage, inequality is less than if some are 
employed at higher-than-market-clearing wages and others are unem-
ployed and earn nothing. So unless this is offset by losses of profits among 
those at the top of the income distribution, inequality will rise. 
Finally, what about poverty? Clearly, some people are poorer than 
17. In Taiwan, for example, multinationals pay the same wages as indigenous firms. 
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before: those who would have been employed when the wage is at the 
market-clearing level but are not employed when the wage is higher. But 
those who remain employed are less poor than before, and may even 
escape from poverty altogether. The income gap between the poorest of 
the poor and everyone else has increased. Most poverty indices would give 
heavy weight to the increasing number of zero-income people, and so 
would register an increase in poverty resulting from a higher-than-market-
clearing wage, but this is not an unambiguous result. 
I conclude that the functioning of labor markets, especially the wage-
setting mechanism, is a cause of a country's macroeconomic growth rate 
and export experience as well as an effect of its macroeconomic conditions. 
The macroeconomic success of the four Asian NICs is caused in part by the 
reliance on market-wage determination in each of their economies. 
Development economists and planners who hold out the export-
oriented development strategy of the four Asian NICs as a model perceive 
that a policy package is needed for successful export-led growth. The 
measures usually mentioned are realistic exchange and interest rates, 
lowering of tariff barriers and other trade restrictions, and the pursuit of 
comparative advantage. Less frequently mentioned, but equally important 
to sound policy formulation, is reliance on supply and demand in labor 
markets to determine wages. Whether success is gauged in terms of output 
growth, export growth, or employment, an outward orientation in a regime 
of artificially high (or low) wages must be given very little chance of 
succeeding. 
Lest any misunderstanding arise from my calling attention to the advan-
tages of market-wage determination, I should make three important 
points. The first is that the goal of any economic system is to provide more 
real purchasing power to more people, and higher employment at higher 
rates of pay is the primary way income gains are realized. Too often, in the 
pursuit of macroeconomic objectives, this fundamental truth is over-
looked. Second, market-wage determination need not lead to wage stagna-
tion or to a shift in the functional distribution of income against labor. Quite 
to the contrary, market-wage determination has led to increases in wages 
and employment in the four Asian NICs, even in Singapore, where wage 
growth was repressed for most of the seventies. And this leads to the third 
observation: that it is one thing to discourage wages from rising above 
market-clearing levels and it is quite another to hold wages below market-
clearing levels. The first has many attractive features; the second does not. 
The record of the four Asian NICs in the last 20 years is clear. Production 
for world markets through labor-intensive methods financed in part by 
foreign investment resulted in full employment and wage increases at high 
rates for the bulk of the labor force. If these gains are to take place 
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elsewhere, premature and excessive wage increases must be avoided. 
Other pertinent conditions are discussed in the conclusion. 
Conclusions and Discussion 
For the last two decades, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have 
pursued policies of export-led growth financed by high rates of domestic 
savings and with active participation of foreign investors. The labor market 
and income distribution experiences during this growth phase have been 
overwhelmingly favorable. Six measures register clear improvement: 
1. Increases in total employment, reductions in unemploy-
ment rates, and increased employment-to-population ra-
tios. 
2. Shift of employment out of agriculture and into manufactur-
ing, a relatively higher-paying activity. 
3. Upgrading of employment composition by activity status, 
occupation, and education. 
4. Rising real earnings. 
5. Constant or falling relative income inequality. 
6. Diminishing absolute poverty. 
Unemployment rates fell from 8 to 10 percent to less than 4 percent in all 
four countries. Real wages rose by as much as a factor of four. Inequality 
levels have fallen to low to moderate levels. In Taiwan, for example, it is 
estimated that the Gini coefficient fell from .5 to .3 over a 20-year period. 
The employment mix also has been upgraded. The share of employment in 
agriculture, the lowest-paying economic sector in each country, fell by 
more than half in Korea and Taiwan. In those two economies, the share of 
manufacturing to total employment increased several-fold. The composi-
tion of employment by activity status improved, so that the proportion of 
unpaid family workers was cut by at least 50 percent in all four countries, 
while the proportion of workers engaged as employees as much as doubled. 
The occupational mix improved, reflecting in part the higher levels of 
education attained by the labor forces; in Hong Kong, for example, the 
proportion of workers with post-secondary or university education more 
than doubled. That such large increases could have taken place within a 
single generation is an enviable achievement. 
An important force contributing to improvement in labor market condi-
tions and income distribution is the expansion of foreign trade and foreign 
investment. It has been estimated in Korea, for example, that the fraction 
of employment linked directly or indirectly to the export sector increased 
from 3 percent to 30 percent. The need for more workers in the export 
sectors was a major factor responsible for increases in aggregate employ-
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ment in each of the four countries. In part, these workers were drawn into 
the export sectors from other sectors of the economy; in the process, their 
incomes rose. In addition, the expanded employment opportunities 
attracted new workers into the labor force—this might be called an "en-
couraged worker effect." Employment-to-population ratios rose as a con-
sequence, raising family incomes and lowering dependency ratios. Also, 
when coupled with the end of the labor-surplus phase, the need to attract 
new workers to the export sectors bid up wages and permitted further 
improvements in standards of living. 
The shift of employment into manufacturing reflects, of course, the shift 
of production into manufacturing as a result of foreign investment in 
manufacturing industries and the export of manufactured goods. What is 
impressive is the sheer volume of these increases. Take the case of 
Taiwan. In the sixties and seventies, while real national income per capita 
increased by a factor of four, the contribution of manufacturing to national 
income nearly tripled, and the value of manufacturing exports increased 
more than a hundredfold! What employment consequences resulted? 
Manufacturing employment tripled and its share of total employment 
doubled, reflecting the choice of labor-intensive production methods for 
export goods. Similar patterns, though on a lesser scale, are recorded in 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Korea. 
The labor intensity of exports is central to "modern-sector enlarge-
ment," that is, the process whereby the creation of more jobs with rela-
tively good pay attracts workers from other, lower-paying sectors of the 
economy. Modern-sector enlargement results in enhanced economic sta-
tus of workers, as reflected in the statistics presented above on upgrading 
of employment by industry, occupation, activity status, and education. 
Labor-intensive development has been made possible by market-wage 
determination in the export sectors. Products of the four Asian NICs have 
remained competitive in world markets because wages have risen only 
when competitiveness would not be undermined. And indeed, real wages 
have risen: by 300 percent in Taiwan from 1954 to 1979; by 190 percent in 
Korea from 1966 to 1980; and by 150 percent in Hong Kong from 1960 to 
1980. Singapore is different. There, real wages per worker stagnated 
between 1966 and 1975; but because full employment was achieved and 
many more jobs were created, real earnings per household increased by 
about 40 percent over the same period. Since 1975, real wages per worker 
have risen by about 20 percent. Thus, in each of these countries, in 
addition to "modern-sector enlargement" referred to earlier, we have 
ample evidence of "modern-sector enrichment," (increases in real in-
comes for those already employed in the modern sector). 
When high rates of modern-sector enlargement and high rates of 
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modern-sector enrichment both take place, as in the four Asian NICs, the 
result is that the benefits of growth are widespread. Income inequalities in 
these four countries are low to moderate by world standards. Inequality 
has fallen in Taiwan in Singapore and is largely unchanged in Hong Kong.18 
This, combined with rising real incomes, implies rapidly declining abso-
lute poverty, as indeed was the case in all four economies. 
Can export-led growth have similarly favorable effects on labor market 
conditions and income distribution in other Less Developed Countries 
(LDCs) in other parts of the world? The answer, I suggest, depends on five 
factors: 
1. The ability of other LDCs to penetrate world markets under 
current conditions. 
2. The asset distribution and infrastructure in those LDCs. 
3. The role of private enterprise and the free market. 
4. The labor intensity of their export goods. 
5. Wage-setting behavior. 
Protectionism: It is common these days to hear fears expressed about the 
future of world trade. Protectionist sentiments are growing as developed 
countries react to domestic economic difficulties. Many fear that LDCs 
may be unable to penetrate world markets to the same degree in the future 
as the four Asian NICs were able to in the past. This prospect is a 
worrisome one, and only time will tell whether these fears prove to be well 
founded. 
Asset Distribution and Infrastructure: For a variety of reasons, each 
country of the four Asian NICs started on its recent development epoch 
with a well-developed infrastructure, with a relatively (by LDC standards) 
well-educated population, and without great inequalities in the distribu-
tion of land or other assets. These initial conditions made it more likely that 
economic growth would have widespread effects throughout the economy, 
improving labor market conditions and income distribution. Absent these 
initial conditions, might it not be expected that the primary gainers from 
free-market growth would be large landowners and industrialists? 
The Private Sector and the Free Market: The governments of Hong 
Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan regard private enterprise and multi-
nationals as partners in development. These countries are widely thought 
to have created an environment that allows the private sector to flourish. 
But private-sector development does not always enhance social welfare. 
18. Excluding Korea because of an unreliable data base. 
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One of the most chilling demonstrations that free market systems may be 
unjust under some circumstances is Amartya Sen's recent book, Poverty 
and Famines.19 Most of us believe that famines are the result of lack of food 
production owing to an excess or a deficit of rainfall, a pest infestation, or 
some other natural cause. But Sen shows that in a number of recent 
famines the case was otherwise. Production of food in the famine regions 
actually increased, yet people starved to death by the tens or even hun-
dreds of thousands. This tragic circumstance came about because food was 
being exported out of the famine areas, where people had lost their 
purchasing power and food prices were relatively low, and sent into other 
regions of the country or even abroad, where food prices were higher. 
Sen's thesis is that it was a breakdown in the system of market entitlements 
to food, and not a breakdown in the production of foodstuffs, that was 
responsible for mass hunger and starvation. The private sector did what it 
was supposed to do, at least at one level—sell its products for the greatest 
return—but at another, more human level, in these instances, reliance on 
market forces failed the people miserably. We must recognize that 
whether the effects of private-sector development of the mass of the 
population are beneficial or not depends on other structural conditions of 
an economy. The desirable features of market systems must be preserved 
without the system's being allowed to run to excess. 
Labor Intensity: One structural feature on which the desirability of a free 
market system depends, and one that is particularly characteristic of the 
Asian NICs, is the labor intensity of exports. These countries were success-
ful in achieving full employment, rising real wages, and favorable income 
distribution outcomes, because their current export phases were preceded 
by the development of export industries intensive in unskilled labor, in 
which they had a comparative advantage. The more typical experience in 
Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa is to try to export land-based or 
capital-intensive products, even under conditions of labor abundance. 
Labor market conditions and income distribution would be expected to 
improve little, if at all, from an expansion of such export activities. Export 
growth cannot be relied upon to raise employment, improve wages, and 
satisfy income distribution goals if the export sector employs relatively few 
people, if the export sector has few linkages with the rest of the economy, 
or if both situations obtain, as is often the case elsewhere. Only when labor 
is a productive resource—a resource that is employed with both techno-
logical and economic efficiency—can export expansion in a private econ-
omy be counted on to raise employment and wages for large numbers of 
19. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. 
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workers. But when conditions are suitable, as they were in the four Asian 
NICs, the ability of the mass of the labor force to benefit from further 
economic expansion through export-led growth is very large indeed. 
Wage Setting Behavior: Full employment was achieved and wage rose 
substantially in real terms in the four Asian NICs. This happened, I argue, 
because wages were pulled up by supply and demand rather than being 
pushed up above market-clearing levels by a variety of institutional forces. 
In most other parts of the world, the situation is just the reverse; that is, 
what is common elsewhere is that wages are set at higher-than-market-
clearing levels. Such wage-setting behavior hampers employment and 
output growth wherever it occurs. But if it takes place in export sectors, 
which must be competitive in world markets if the goods are to be sold, the 
adverse effect is even greater. The economies of South Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America and the Caribbean cannot be successful exporters unless 
wage growth is restrained and wages are allowed to reach market-clearing 
levels. Otherwise, whatever policies these countries might follow to pro-
mote economic development, the pursuit of export-led growth ought not to 
be among them. The interrelationships between industrialization and 
trade strategies on the one hand and the functioning of labor markets on 
the other is a largely unexplored area, but one that holds much promise for 
future analysis. 
